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I. INTRODUCTION 
He was not the first choice of President Ronald Reagan or 
even the second choice.1  Instead, Justice Anthony McLeod Ken-
                                                   
                David L. Hudson, Jr. is a Justice Robert H. Jackson Legal Fellow with the 
Foundation for Individual Rights in Education (FIRE) and a First Amendment Fellow with 
the Freedom Forum Institute.  He also is a Visiting Associate Professor of Legal Practice at 
Belmont University College of Law. 
 1. President Reagan’s first choice was Judge Robert Bork. The Senate rejected Bork 
by a vote of 42-58. President Reagan’s second choice was Judge Douglas H. Ginsburg who 
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nedy was the President’s third choice for the United States Su-
preme Court.2  Called a “true conservative” by the President,3 Ken-
nedy may be most remembered for his opinions on sexual equality4 
and for often serving as the key swing vote during much of his 30-
year tenure on the Court.5  Many referred to him as the decisive 
vote caster.6 Others called the Roberts Court “the Kennedy 
Court.”7 
But, Justice Kennedy also will be remembered for his many 
and varied contributions to First Amendment jurisprudence.  
Notre Dame law professor Richard Garnett called him a “free 
speech hawk.”8  Cornell law professor Michael Dorf wrote that “on 
free speech questions, he may well have been the most libertarian 
justice in the Supreme Court’s history.”9 Political commentator 
Michael Barone called the First Amendment his “first priority.”10 
                                                   
withdrew before the Senate voted on his confirmation. Linda Greenhouse, Reagan Nomi-
nates Anthony Kennedy to Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1987, at A1. 
 2. Sherry Colb, Justice Kennedy, abortion and the legacy of a third choice, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Jul. 6, 2018, 9:50 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/07/justice-kennedy-
abortion-and-the-legacy-of-a-third-choice/. 
 3. Timothy J. McNulty, “President Chooses Kennedy, High-Court Selection Draws 
Praise,” Chicago Tribune, Nov. 12, 1987, at p. 1-C.   
 4. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)(striking down a Colorado state constitu-
tional amendment prohibiting cities from passing laws prohibiting discrimination based on 
sexual orientation); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)(invalidating a Texas same-sex 
sodomy law); United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013)(invalidating a section of the 
Defense of Marriage Act prohibiting benefits to same-sex partners); Obergefell v. Hodges, 
576 U.S. _ (2015)(invaliding state laws prohibiting same-sex marriage).   
 5. See Jess Bravin, “Kennedy is key to U.S. top court – Justice holds sway as new 
‘swing vote,’ favors broad sweep,” Wall Street Journal, Oct. 3, 2006 (stating that “Ever since 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor retired last year, the High Court has been dubbed the Ken-
nedy Court.”); Douglas M. Parker. Justice Kennedy: The Swing Voter and His Critics, 11 
Green Bag 2d 317 (2008). Some legal experts even predicted Justice Kennedy would be a 
key swing vote before he started serving on the High Court.  See David Savage, “Experts 
Think Kennedy May Be New Swing Vote; Californian Seen as Deciding Each Case on Its 
Merits,” Los Angeles Times, Nov. 12, 1987, at p. 1.  
 6. Charles D. Kelso and R. Randall Kelso. The Constitutional Jurisprudence of Jus-
tice Kennedy on Speech, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 693, 694 (2012).   
 7. David Cole, “This Isn’t the Roberts Court, It’s the Kennedy Court,” The Nation, 
Sept. 24, 2015, at https://www.thenation.com/article/this-isnt-the-roberts-court-its-the-
kennedy-court/; Adam Liptak, “In Influence If Not Title, This Has Been the Kennedy 
Court,” The New York Times, June 27, 2018, at https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/27/us/pol-
itics/anthony-kennedy-career.html; Jonathan H. Adler. “Say Goodbye to the Kennedy 
Court,” Volokh Conspiracy, June 28, 2018, at https://reason.com/volokh/2018/06/28/say-
goodbye-to-the-kennedy-court. 
 8. Quoted in Kevin Clarke, “A former clerk assesses the legacy of Justice Kennedy, 
a constitutional romantic,” America, June 28, 2018, at https://www.americamaga-
zine.org/politics-society/2018/06/28/former-clerk-assesses-legacy-justice-anthony-kennedy-
constitutional. 
 9. Michael Dorf, Tribute: Justice Kennedy’s genius, SCOTUSBLOG (Jun. 28, 2018, 
8:32 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/06/tribute-justice-kennedys-genius/. 
 10. Michael Barone. “Justice Kennedy’s First Priority: The First Amendment,” 
RealClearPolitics, June 29, 2018, at https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2018/06/29/ 
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Cato Institute scholar Ilya Shapiro called him “the strongest de-
fender of the First Amendment the Supreme Court has ever 
seen.”11 Prolific scholar Eugene Volokh found Justice Kennedy to 
be the most speech-protective justice on the Court.12 
Many believe that Justice Kennedy had special reverence for 
the first forty-five words of the Bill of Rights.  A former law clerk 
describes how Justice Kennedy asked her during the clerkship in-
terview what she thought about New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 
the Court’s landmark libel decision.13  Solicitor General Noel Fran-
cisco said that “his commitment to our cherished First Amendment 
freedom of speech will be a legacy for generations to come.”14 
This essay reviews some of Kennedy’s most significant contri-
butions to First Amendment jurisprudence.  These include his 
calls for absolute protection for pure political speech, his strong 
protection for commercial speech, his distaste for campaign fi-
nance reform laws that censored speech, his general concern for 
the silencing of sexual expression, his coercion test in Establish-
ment Clause cases, and his significant failure in the public-em-
ployee free-speech decision Garcetti v. Ceballos.15   
II. ABSOLUTE PROTECTION FOR PURE POLITICAL SPEECH  
Justice Kennedy’s reputation as a free-speech protector 
emerged from concurring opinions in which he advocated that con-
tent-based restrictions on pure political speech are per se uncon-
stitutional.  Traditionally, under the content discrimination prin-
ciple, content-based laws are subject to strict scrutiny and content-
neutral laws are subject to intermediate scrutiny.   
Kennedy wrote that there was no need to even engage in any 
balancing when a law imposed content discrimination on political 
speech.  He advanced this view in his concurring opinion in Simon 
& Schuster v. Crime Victims Bd.16 The case involved New York’s 
“Son of Sam” law – a law named after serial killer David Berkowitz 
                                                   
justice_kennedys_first_priority_the_first_amendment_137387.html. 
 11. Quoted in “Did Anthony Kennedy Just Destroy His Own Legacy?” Politico.com, 
June 29, 2018. 
 12. Eugene Volokh, How the Justices Voted in Free-Speech Cases 1994-2000, 48 
UCLA L. REV. 1191 (2001). 
 13. Nancy L. Combs, “Justice Kennedy’s controversial judicial philosophy, described 
by former law clerk,” Vox, July 2, 2018, at https://www.vox.com/first-per-
son/2018/6/30/17520572/kennedy-retirement-supreme-court-clerk-remembers-reflections. 
 14. Quoted in Katie Benner, “Anthony Kennedy Retires from Supreme Court, and 
McConnell Says Senate Will Move Quickly on Replacement,” The New York Times, June 
27, 2018, at https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/27/us/politics/anthony-kennedy-supreme-
court-live-briefing.html. 
 15. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
 16. Simon & Schuster v. Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1991). 
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– that allowed the state to seize monetary proceeds from expres-
sive works by those who published works about their crimes.  The 
state passed the law to protect crime victims.17  The Court invali-
dated the law primarily because it was overbroad and could apply 
to works in which authors mentioned their crimes only in passing.  
For example, the Court explained the law, if enacted earlier, could 
apply to classics such as St. Augustine’s Confessions of St. Augus-
tine, Henry David Thoreau’s Civil Disobedience, and Malcolm X’s 
The Autobiography of Malcolm X.18   
Justice Kennedy wrote separately to explain why there was 
no need to apply strict scrutiny.  He first explained that the law 
did not fit into a narrow unprotected category of speech, such as 
defamation, obscenity, or incitement to imminent lawless action.19  
He then explained why the application of strict scrutiny was un-
necessary:  “Borrowing the compelling interest and narrow tailor-
ing analysis is ill advised when all that is at issue is a content-
based restriction, for resort to the test might be read as a conces-
sion that States may censor speech whenever they believe there is 
a compelling justification for doing so. Our precedents and tradi-
tions allow no such inference.”20 
Kennedy referenced Justice Thurgood Marshall’s famous dec-
laration that “[a]bove all else, the First Amendment means that 
the government may not restrict speech because of its message, its 
ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”21 
Justice Kennedy again urged for the full protection of pure 
political speech again in a case involving a Minnesota speech re-
striction on judicial candidates.22  A provision in the Minnesota 
Code of Judicial Conduct prohibited judicial candidates from an-
nouncing their views on “disputed legal or political issues.”23  The 
Supreme Court narrowly (5-4) invalidated the law on First 
Amendment grounds.  The majority applied strict scrutiny and 
questioned whether the state had a compelling interest for its 
                                                   
 17. Id. at 108. 
 18. Id. at 121. 
 19. Id. at 124 (J. Kennedy, concurring). 
 20. Id. at 124-25 (J. Kennedy, concurring). 
 21. Id. at 126 (J. Kennedy, concurring), quoting Chicago Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 
U.S. 92, 95 (1972). Justice Marshall’s statement in Mosley is one of the most powerful in 
First Amendment jurisprudence. See David L. Hudson, Jr. “Justice Marshall: Eloquent 
First Amendment Defender,” Newseum Institute, Feb. 4, 2013, at http://www.newseumin-
stitute.org/2013/02/04/justice-marshall-eloquent-first-amendment-defender/.  Justice Mar-
shall was one of the Court’s most consistent free-speech defenders.  David L. Hudson, Jr. 
Justice Thurgood Marshall, Great Defender of First Amendment Free-Speech Rights for the 
Powerless, 2 HOWARD HUMAN & CIVIL RIGHTS L. REV. 167 (2017).  
 22. Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002). 
 23. Id. at 768. 
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speech restriction.24 
Once again, Justice Kennedy was even stronger than his col-
leagues in denouncing the law as flagrant violation of the First 
Amendment: “I adhere to my view, however, that content-based 
speech restrictions that do not fall within any traditional exception 
should be invalidated without inquiry into narrow tailoring or 
compelling government interests.”25   
III. COMMERCIAL SPEECH  
Justice Kennedy was a strong advocate for commercial speech 
during his tenure on the Court.  He wrote for a unanimous Court 
in striking down a ban on accountant solicitation in Edenfield v. 
Fane.26  Kennedy wrote that solicitation “may have considerable 
value.”27 Kennedy also strengthened the penultimate prong of the 
Central Hudson test – the test used for evaluating restrictions on 
commercial speech.28  That prong requires that the regulation di-
rectly and materially advance the government’s interests.29  In 
Edenfield, Kennedy wrote: “This burden is not satisfied by mere 
speculation or conjecture; rather, a governmental body seeking to 
sustain a restriction on commercial speech must demonstrate that 
the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in fact 
alleviate them to a material degree.”30 
Kennedy also showed his distaste for commercial speech re-
strictions that deny information to the public in Florida Bar v. 
Went-For-It, Inc., a case involving a Florida rule that prohibits 
lawyers from sending direct-mail solicitation letters to accident 
victims until 30 days after the event.31  The majority upheld the 
rule, relying on a 106-page, two-year study of the impact of adver-
tising upon the profession.  In his dissenting opinion, Kennedy 
blasted the study as “noteworthy for its incompetence.”32  He crit-
icized the rule for depriving those persons most need in legal as-
sistance of needed information: “The accident victims who are prej-
udiced to vindicate the State’s purported desire for more dignity in 
the legal profession will be the very persons who most need legal 
advice, for they are the victims who, because they lack education, 
                                                   
 24. Id. at 778-80.  
 25. Id. at 793 (J. Kennedy, concurring). 
 26. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993). 
 27. Id. at 766.  
 28. The Court developed the Central Hudson test in Central Hudson Gas & Elec. 
Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
 29. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 557. 
 30. Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 770-71. 
 31. Florida Bar v. Went-For-It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995). 
 32. Id. at 640 (J. Kennedy, dissenting).  
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linguistic ability, or familiarity with the legal system, are unable 
to seek out legal services.”33 
Kennedy wrote the Court’s opinion invalidating a Vermont 
law that restricted the sale of information related to doctors’ drug 
prescribing practices in Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc.34 The law gen-
erally prohibited the sale of the information to pharmaceutical 
manufacturers but allowed educational institutes to purchase 
such information.35  Justice Kennedy found the law to violate the 
First Amendment because it imposed impermissible content and 
speaker distinctions.  Even in the realm of commercial speech, 
which receives less protection, “[t]he State may not burden the 
speech of others in order to tilt public debate in a preferred direc-
tion,” he wrote.36  
IV. CORPORATE SPEAKERS  
Justice Kennedy’s most famous, or infamous, First Amend-
ment decision for many may be his majority opinion in Citizens 
United v. FEC.37 The Court in Citizens United invalidated a part 
of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act that prohibited all corpo-
rations – even nonprofit advocacy corporations – from broadcast-
ing electioneering communications advocating the support or de-
feat of political candidates within 30 days of a primary election 
and 60 days of a general election.38   
Kennedy explained that the government violates the First 
Amendment when it favors or disfavors certain speakers.39  He 
further explained that the corporations are entitled to contribute 
to public discourse just as much as individuals.40  The government 
advanced a series of arguments as to why corporate spending 
posed a threat to the political process, but Kennedy was unmoved.  
To him, the federal law amounted to a flat ban on political speech 
and rank discrimination against corporate speakers.41  To Ken-
nedy, this amounted to a flagrant violation of the First Amend-
ment: “The First Amendment does not permit Congress to make 
these categorical distinctions based on the corporate identity of the 
speaker and the content of the political speech.”42 
                                                   
 33. Id. at 643 (J. Kennedy, dissenting). 
 34. Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 562 (2011).  
 35. Id. at 563-64. 
 36. Id. at 578-79.  
 37. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).  
 38. Id. at 337. 
 39. Id. at 340. 
 40. Id. at 342. 
 41. Id. at 362-64. 
 42. Id. at 364. 
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While Citizens United was Kennedy’s only majority opinion, 
he wrote quite frequently in the area of campaign finance and free-
dom of speech.43  Kennedy authored a strong dissenting opinion in 
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,44 the decision he over-
ruled in Citizens United.45  In his dissent, Kennedy criticized the 
disparate treatment received by corporate speakers: “The protec-
tion afforded core political speech is not diminished because the 
speaker is a nonprofit corporation.”46 
V. SEXUAL EXPRESSION  
Kennedy generally invalidated laws that restricted sexual ex-
pression, viewing them as impermissibly content-based.  He wrote 
the Court’s decision in United States v. Playboy Entertainment 
Group, Inc., invalidating a federal law that required cable opera-
tors to block sexually oriented programs during hours when chil-
dren watch television because of the problem of signal bleed.47  “It 
is rare that a regulation restricting speech because of its content 
will ever be permissible,” he wrote.48 
Kennedy reasoned that the law could not pass strict scrutiny 
even though the government has a compelling interest in protect-
ing minors.  The problem was that the law was not narrowly tai-
lored enough, there was a less-speech restrictive alternative: 
“Simply put, targeted blocking is less restrictive than banning, 
and the Government cannot ban speech if targeted blocking is a 
feasible and effective means of furthering its compelling inter-
ests.”49 
Kennedy wrote the Court’s opinion in Ashcroft v. Free Speech 
Coalition, invalidating two provisions of the Child Pornography 
Prevention Act of 1996, designed to address the problems of virtual 
pornography.50  The law allowed for the punishment of material 
that “appeared to be” a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct.  
This troubled Justice Kennedy, in part because the law was clearly 
too broad and could apply to such mainstream, award-winning 
movies as Traffic and American Beauty.51  But, he objected to the 
                                                   
 43. Helen J. Knowles, What a Difference Five Years Haven’t Made: Justice Kennedy 
and the First Amendment, 2007-2012, 82 UMKC 79, 103-04 (2013).   
 44. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990). 
 45. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 319 (“We agree with that conclusion and hold that 
stare decisis does not compel the continued acceptance of Austin.”).  
 46. Austin, 494 U.S. at 699 (J. Kennedy, dissenting).   
 47. U.S. v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000). 
 48. Id. at 818.   
 49. Id. at 815.   
 50. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002). 
 51. Id. at 247. 
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law for another more profound reason.  He feared that the govern-
ment was drifting dangerously close to thought control, a concept 
anathema to Justice Kennedy’s conception of liberty.  He wrote: 
“First Amendment freedoms are most in danger when the govern-
ment seeks to control thought or to justify its laws for that imper-
missible end. The right to think is the beginning of freedom, and 
speech must be protected from the government because speech is 
the beginning of thought.”52 
Even in the area of zoning adult businesses, Kennedy was 
more sensitive to speech concerns than most of his colleagues.  In 
zoning cases, the Supreme Court allows municipalities and county 
officials to impose selective zoning restrictions on adult oriented 
businesses and treat such laws as content-neutral.53 The Court re-
lies on the so-called secondary effects doctrine.  The idea is that 
government officials are not banning or regulating speech because 
they find it offensive but because they are addressing the adverse, 
secondary effects associated with such speech – such as increased 
crime or decreased property values.54 The doctrine is controversial 
to many First Amendment advocates because it leads to content-
based laws being treated as content-neutral laws.55  
Justice Kennedy recognized that the designation of a content-
based law as content-neutral was an anomaly and a “fiction” in 
First Amendment jurisprudence in his concurring opinion in City 
of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc.56 However, he still held that 
a city’s zoning laws of adult businesses could be evaluated as con-
tent-neutral, presuming the laws actually address secondary ef-
fects and do not reduce speech.57  “This capacity of zoning regula-
tion to address the practical problems without eliminating the 
speech is, after all, the only possible excuse for speaking of second-
ary-effects zoning as akin to time, place, or manner regulations.”58 
VI. THE COERCION TEST IN CHURCH-STATE CASES  
Justice Kennedy contributed to Establishment Clauses juris-
prudence by introducing the coercion test.  In 1989, Kennedy first 
articulated his vision in a separate opinion that concurred in part 
                                                   
 52. Id. at 253.  
 53. Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976); Renton v. Playtime Thea-
tres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986). 
 54. David L. Hudson, Jr., The Secondary Effects Doctrine: The Evisceration of First 
Amendment Freedoms, 47 WASHBURN L.J. 55 (1997). 
55.     David L. Hudson, Jr. The Secondary-Effects Doctrine: Stripping Away First 
Amendment Freedoms. 23 STAN. LAW & POLY REV. 19 (2012).  
 56. City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 448 (2002) (J. Kennedy, 
concurring). 
 57. Id.  
 58. Id. at 457. 
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and dissented in part from the main opinion in Allegheny County 
v. ACLU.59  The case involved challenges to both a crèche display 
from Allegheny County and a menorah display from Pittsburgh. 
The Court upheld the menorah display, which was next to a 
Christmas tree.  However, the Court invalidated the crèche dis-
play, which was in a county courthouse.  The Court utilized the 
Lemon test to evaluate the constitutionality of the displays.60   
Justice Kennedy wrote separately, contending that both dis-
plays did not violate the Establishment Clause.  Kennedy empha-
sized the importance of coercion, that the government may not co-
erce someone to support or advance religion or “give direct benefits 
to religion” that create the appearance of a state-sanctioned reli-
gion.61  Kennedy explained: “The freedom to worship as one 
pleases without government interference or oppression is the great 
object of both the Establishment and the Free Exercise Clauses. 
Barring all attempts to aid religion through government coercion 
goes far toward attainment of this object.”62 Applying the coercion 
principle to the religious displays, Kennedy concluded that “the 
risk of infringement of religious liberty by passive or symbolic ac-
commodation is minimal.”63   
Kennedy applied his coercion analysis – this time in a major-
ity opinion – to invalidate school-sponsored graduation prayer at 
a middle school in Lee v. Weisman.64  A rabbi had delivered a 
prayer at a Providence middle school.  Kennedy reasoned that 
school-sponsored prayer at a graduation imposed subtle coercive 
pressures upon religious minorities and, therefore, violated the 
Establishment Clause:  
The undeniable fact is that the school district’s supervision 
and control of a high school graduation ceremony places public 
pressure, as well as peer pressure, on attending students to stand 
as a group or, at least, maintain respectful silence during the in-
vocation and benediction. This pressure, though subtle and indi-
rect, can be as real as any overt compulsion.65  
To Kennedy, young students could face a significant “conflict 
of conscience” when faced with such school-sponsored prayer.66  
Kennedy’s opinion drew the wrath of Justice Antonin Scalia who 
                                                   
 59. Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).   
 60. Id. at 628-29. The Lemon test refers to the three-part developed by the Court in 
Lemon v. Kurtzman 403 US 602 (1971).   
 61. Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 659 (J. Kennedy, concurring in the judgment in 
part and dissenting in part). 
 62. Id. at 661 (J. Kennedy, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).  
 63. Id. (J. Kennedy, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
 64. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
 65. Lee, 505 U.S. at 593.   
 66. Id. at 596.   
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ridiculed Kennedy’s “psycho-coercion” test.67  Scalia called the test 
“boundless” and criticized what he termed the Court’s “psycho-
journey.”68 
But, the Court later used Kennedy’s coercion analysis to 
strike down a Texas high school district’s practice of announcing 
prayers over the loudspeaker.69  The Court wrote that “we are nev-
ertheless persuaded that the delivery of a pregame prayer has the 
improper effect of coercing those present to participate in an act of 
religious worship.”70 
VII. A BLOT ON HIS RECORD  
Kennedy’s contributions to the First Amendment have not all 
been positive.  A candid assessment of Kennedy’s First Amend-
ment record requires analysis of his decision in the public em-
ployee free-speech decision Garcetti v. Ceballos.71  The decision has 
led to a significant loss of protection for the free-speech protections 
of public employees.72 
Traditionally, the U.S. Supreme Court had evaluated public 
employee free-speech cases under something known as the Picker-
ing-Connick test – a test named after two public employee free-
speech decisions Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. (1968)73 and Connick v. 
Myers (1983).74  Under this test, the initial question is whether the 
public employee spoke on a matter of public concern or importance 
or rather uttered what amounts to a private grievance.75  If the 
employee speaks on a matter of public concern, the court must bal-
ance the employee’s right to free-speech against the employer’s ef-
ficiency interests in a disruptive-free workplace.76   
Garcetti added a new threshold categorical rule in public-em-
ployee free-speech cases.77  Justice Kennedy declared in Garcetti: 
“When public employees make statements pursuant to their offi-
cial duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First 
Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate 
                                                   
 67. Id. at 644 (J. Scalia, dissenting).   
 68. Id. at 643 (J. Scalia, dissenting).   
 69. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000). 
 70. Id. at 312.   
 71. Garcetti, 547 U.S. 410.   
 72. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Not a Free Speech Court, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 723, 726 
(2011). 
 73. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
 74. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
 75. Id. at 146. 
 76. Id. at 150. 
 77. Sheldon H. Nahmod, Public Employee Speech, Categorical Balancing and § 1983: 
A Critique of Garcetti v. Ceballos, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 561, 572 (2008).   
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their communications from employer discipline.”78 
Thus, under Garcetti, if a public employee engages in official 
job duty speech, she or he has zero free-speech protections.79  It 
doesn’t matter how important the speech, that the speech may 
blow the whistle on the most abject of corruption, or the speech 
contributes vitally to societal understanding of how the govern-
ment operates.  The decision is a blot on his free-speech record.80 
The decision has been a jurisprudential disaster81 and has led 
to a sharp reduction in the free-speech rights of police officers,82 
public school teachers,83 and others.  The decision now has become 
something of an eponym, as plaintiffs’ attorneys representing pub-
lic employees now refer to being “Garcettized.”84 
VIII. CONCLUSION  
Most scholars have considered Justice Kennedy a strong de-
fender of freedom of speech.  He certainly showed a strong distaste 
for censorship85 and content discrimination, often waxing quite el-
oquently against them.86  He abhorred viewpoint discrimination, 
once referring to as “an egregious form of content discrimina-
tion.”87  His record on the First Amendment may depend on 
whether one views money as speech or property, as Citizens United 
is often considered his most important free-speech opinion.88 
                                                   
 78. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421.  
 79. David L. Hudson, Jr.  “No Free Speech for You: Anthony Kennedy Has the Chance 
to Undo his worst anti-First Amendment decision. He should take it.”  Slate, Aug. 4, 2017, 
at http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2017/08/anthony_ken-
nedy_has_the_chance_to_undo_his_worst_first_amendment_decision.html. 
 80. David L. Hudson, Jr. “Justice Kennedy Made His Mark on First Amendment Ju-
risprudence,” First Amendment Encyclopedia, July 1, 2018, at https://mtsu.edu/first-
amendment/post/157/hudson-justice-anthony-kennedy-made-his-mark-on-first-amend-
ment-jurisprudence. 
 81. Id.  
 82. David L. Hudson, Jr. “Another public employee ‘Garcettized’ in Chicago cop case,” 
The First Amendment Encyclopedia, May 12, 2018, at https://mtsu.edu/first-amend-
ment/post/126/another-public-employee-garcettized-in-chicago-cop-case. 
 83. Erica R. Salkin, Caution in the Classroom: Teacher In-Class Speech, the Federal 
Courts, and Garcetti, 15 Comm. L & Pol’y 175 (2010); Martha M. McCarthy and Suzanne 
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